News

NR3C is conducting a seminar on Cyber Security - Challenges and Solutions at ,Marriott Hotel Islamabad in Collaboration with LMK resources on Feb 25, 2003. Where Federal Minister for Interior & Narcotics control will
be the chief guest. 

NR3C is also initiating a training program following this seminar to fill in the gap among the Government
employees on the subject. A comprehensive training program has been formulated in this regard. The
training program consist of three levels.

(a)   Foundation
(b)   Elementary/Working
(c)   Advance

Other Courses Offered

(d)  Cyber Security for Executives
(e)  Legislation in Cyber Security

Establishment of Task Force on National Information Infrastructure Protection.

The specific functions of Task Force will be:

  1. Identify our national and critical information infrastructures.
  2. Conduct vulnerabilities and threat assessments in order to formulate a responsive national
    information security programs.
  3. Help in formulation of Cyber Crime Law that will specifically address each and every
    component of Cyber Technology as it effects national economy and security.

    Topics as diverse as Money laundering to Biometrics will be covered at the seminar.
    A complete list of the topics is available below.


Implementing an Effective IT Security Program

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to take the wide variety of federal government laws, regulations, and
guidance combined with industry best practices and define the essential elements of an effective IT
security program. The following are five critical elements of a security:

1. Periodically Assess Risk
2. Document an entity-wide security program plan
3. Establish a security management structure and clearly assign security responsibilities
4. Implement effective security-related personnel policies
5. Monitor the security program’s effectiveness and make changes as necessary

Periodically Assess Risk

Assessing your organization’s risk is one of two beginning steps in developing a security program.
The other is establishing a security management structure and clearly assigning security responsibilities. The latter is more difficult in a large decentralized organization and takes much longer than you would think. This will be discussed in further detail later in this paper. As you are formalizing your structure, risk assessments and mitigations strategies are still going to need to be accomplished. Without having an understanding of your risk you are unable to determine the proper security policies, procedures, guidelines, and standards to put in place to ensure adequate security controls are implemented. A risk assessment has three major components – threat assessment, vulnerability assessment, and asset identification. Threats can be grouped in many different ways. We will use 4 categories – malicious insider (disgruntled employee, contractor, insider theft), accidental insider (poorly trained, curious) malicious outsider (hacker, industrial espionage) and natural (fire, flood). This is not intended to be all-inclusive, but to get you thinking in the right areas.

1. INFOSEC Documentation
a. Do you have a security plan, risk assessment report, contingency plan, configuration management
    plan, and security, test, and evaluation report?
b. If so, what are the dates, if not when are they planned?


2. INFOSEC Roles and Responsibilities
a. Does this system have an Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) assigned?
b. Do you know who your Designated Approving Authority (DAA) is? (This is the executive
    responsible for the security of the system)

3. Identification and Authentication
a. What password policy does your system enforce?
i. Number of Characters (minimum 7 or 8)
ii. Complexity (3 of following 4- upper and lowercase, numbers, special characters)
iii. Aging (90 days – max)
iv. Account Lockout (5 attempts)
v. What method do you use to encrypt passwords in transit and in storage? (key type, key length, etc)
b. Do you have a procedure for identifying users before resetting passwords?

4. Account Management/Access Controls
a. Do you have a method of authorizing new accounts and getting rid of old accounts?
b. Do you have a process to limit access based on job function and/or roles?
c. Do you regularly review your access control lists, if so how often?
d. Do you give individuals only enough access to do their jobs? (i.e. Least privilege)

5. Session Controls
a. Do you enforce each user to be logged on with only one session?
b. Do you enforce password protected screen savers?

6. External Connectivity
a. Does this system have any external connectivity?
i.  Wireless (describe controls)
ii.  Internet (describe controls- e.g. VPN, FW, etc)
iii. Dial-in (describe controls- e.g. authentication method, encryption, etc.)

7. Security Products
a. Do you use a firewall (briefly describe what is and is not allowed to this box)
b. Do you use an intrusion detection system? (host, network, briefly describe configuration)
c. Do you use a policy compliance tool or agent?
d. Do you use vulnerability scanning tools?
e. Do you use encryption? If so, describe (symmetric, asymmetric, key lengths, etc.)

8. Auditing
a. Do you have auditing turned on?
b. What events are you auditing for?
c. How often do you review audit logs?

9. Virus Protection
a. Do you have virus protection installed?
b. How often is it updated and is it automatic?

10. Contingency Planning/Backups
a. How often do you do back-ups?
b. Do you have procedures to restore system?
c. How many people could restore system?
d. How long would it take to restore system?
e. Where do you keep your backups in relation to your system?
f.  Do you have a contingency plan that includes continuity of operations?
g. Have you tested your back-up procedures?

11. Maintenance
a. Have you hardened the system using NSA Hardening Guides or other Industry hardening guides?
   (explain)
b. Have you applied all applicable security patches?
c. Have you secured your systems using the SANS Top 20?

12. Configuration Management
a. How do you do change management?
b. Do you have a separate system to test changes?
c. Do you have a configuration management plan?

13. Media Sanitization/Disposal
a. Is your data sensitive, so that it should not be obtainable upon disposal?
b. What method do you use to dispose of data?
i.  Hard drive (Triple overwrite, degauss)
ii. Tapes (degauss)
iii. CDs (incinerate, chemically destroy)
iv. Paper (shred)

14. Physical Environment
a. Are your servers in a locked room with tight access controls?
b. What kind of access controls does your building have?
c. Are there any special considerations that need to be taken into consideration based on building
    location? (hurricanes, floods, etc)
d. Is your system protected from environmental threats? (heat, fire, water, etc)

15. Personnel Security
a. Are your users trained on the security of this system or have they taken security awareness
    training?
b. Have your users read the rules of behavior for either this system or organizational rules or policies?
c. Have employees and/or contractors who have privileged access to this system undergone
    background investigations?
d. Do you have separation of duties between programmers and administrators? (If not, what do you use
    to prevent abuses)

16. Incident Handling/Security Advisory Handling
a. Briefly describe your process to handle incidents
b. Briefly describe your process to handle security advisories

17. Security Awareness Training/Security Training
a. Have you provided security awareness training to all employees?
b. Is security awareness an ongoing activity throughout the year?
c. Are your security officers, system administrators, senior executives, system program managers,
    and business/functional managers trained in their security responsibilities?

The answers to these questions along with some random sampling of specific technical controls
will give you a basis for your vulnerabilities. Before you begin the daunting task of asset analysis,
you can quickly identify and mitigate some of the highest risk items that you discovered in your
vulnerability phase. I know the textbook solution is to analyze likelihood of exploitation against
impact to asset and rank the risks accordingly, but certain hardening and patching steps should
be taken immediately upon vulnerability discovery and cannot wait for the completion of a
comprehensive report. This is where it is essential that common sense be used. When you have
completed these three steps you can then compare the threats to your systems (which house
your information) to the vulnerabilities you have found and balance that against the need and cost
to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of that asset. There ends up being a lot of
professional judgment that goes into this analysis. Unfortunately as we become more and more
connected with our internal systems as well as external systems, it is becoming increasingly
important to put a fair amount of management, operational, and technical controls on all of our
systems. For example, you may have an intranet web server that has no access to the Internet
and does not carry any sensitive data. You do your CIA analysis and determine that there is little
need for confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Management may determine that if something
happens to that server it can be rebuilt and back on line in a few days with no effect on business
operations. This may not be the right decision. A home user that dials in can infect that server.
Analyzing connectivity becomes very important in this analysis.

You have defined your assets, looked at the threats against you, and determined the vulnerabilities
you have. You know where your greatest risks reside. For those high risks you will need to do short
term hardening, patching, etc. You will not be able to wait the year or more it takes to develop sound
policies, procedures, and standards in a large decentralized organization. The cyber-criminals are not
going to wait until you coordinate your new firewall policy through three layers of management before
you cut-off some new dangerous threat. In spite of short-term tactical necessity, sound policy,
procedures, standards, and guides are critical in ensuring the long-term security of your assets.

In addition to an initial review of your security risks, risks should be assessed on a continuing basis as
new threats and vulnerabilities manifest themselves and new assets are put into operation.
You have now completed the first critical element of the security program – the risk assessment.
Now it is time to develop the security program plan. Document an entity-wide security program plan
There are many different opinions on what should go into an entity-wide security program plan.
I have found these six general areas to be the most valuable.

1. Security management structure and security responsibilities
2. Security Policy, procedures, guides, and standards
3. Security Training and Awareness
4. Incident Handling and Security Advisory Handling
5. Compliance Reviews and Enforcement (including vulnerability scanning and penetration
    testing)


Security management structure and security responsibilities

This is a very important step and needs management buy-in throughout the organization.
It is the first step in creating an entity-wide security program plan, but it is also one of the critical
elements in the overall program.
System Administrator – Responsible for the day-day care and feeding of the system to include
security hardening and patching, backups, etc.
Data Owner or Business/Functional Manager – Helps set the requirements for the level of protection
needed for their process or data. Now that we see an example of an ideal structure on paper, I would
like to describe where this structure has some challenges in actual implementation. A couple of big challenges are related to the DAAs. In organizations that have matrix management, coupled with both centralized and decentralized processes and information technology, it is a challenge to determine
exactly who the DAA is. Another challenge lies in the fact that the DAAs sometimes take on more
risk than they really should be allowed to. Up until now, both corporate America and government have
not held their senior executives accountable for security breaches very often. Until some of them are
held liable for lacking due diligence, this trend will continue. Another big area is the relationship
between the system administrator and the information systems security officer. The ISSO is
responsible for ensuring the security of the system, but in many cases they either do not have
management backing or they do not have the technical expertise to ensure the systems are operating securely. They rely on the system administrator who is primarily concerned with keeping the
system running. In some cases, the system administrator is the security officer. This often increases
the technical security controls of the system, but this person is generally very overworked and is not
able to create the plan and procedural documents that ensure the long term security of the system
and keep the auditors happy. There is also the question of separation of duty and the fact that many
system administrators are contract employees who may have less than a vested interested in the
company. Until management takes security more seriously and some of the reporting requirements
are reduced, I think we are heading down a dangerous path. Everyone from auditors to budget
managers to customers are demanding more prove of how secure the systems are, but the more
reporting you have to do the less time you have to secure the system. I believe we need to move
toward a more minimalist approach to documentation and only document the processes that are
absolutely necessary. I have seen too many hundred page security documents sitting on shelves and
too much time wasted creating them. Finally, even though the security responsibilities are defined,
individuals need to have their yearly performance reviews or in the case of senior management their
bonuses incorporate security related incentives and/or disincentives. Since few system administrators, system program managers, or senior executives are rated on their security posture, things will be
slow to change.

Security Policy, procedures, guides, and standards

It is now time to document your security policy. All security documentation to follow will be based of
your security policy. (Some more direct than others). Where do you start? There are a number of good
places to help you formulate and document the requirements to go into your policy including public law (especially if you are a government agency), your risk assessment, OMB A-130, NIST 800-26, and
Charles Cresson Wood’s “Information Security Policies Made Easy”. A combination of high level and
detailed policies are necessary to achieve your security goal. I know there are a couple of different
camps on how detailed policies should be – ranging from “All systems shall authenticate their users
before they are allowed access” to “All systems shall employee a minimum of 8 character passwords,
using a combination of special characters, letters, and numbers which are changed every 90 days and
not repeatable up to 10 iterations.” To keep your enterprise consistent, I favor the latter, but being that
detailed may not work in some organizations.

Allowing flexibility in policy using risk-based decision-making is also very important

        Table 1

Management Controls Vulnerability Assessment Mapping
1. Risk Management Risk Assessment Itself
2. Review of Security Controls InfoSec Documentation
3. Lifecycle Configuration Management
4. Certification and Accreditation InfoSec Documentation
5. System Security Plan InfoSec Documentation
Operational Controls  
6. Personnel Security Personnel Security
7. Physical Security Physical Environment
8. Production, Input/Output Controls Media Sanitization/Disposal
9. Contingency Planning Contingency Planning/Backups
10. HW/SW Maintenance Maintenance
11. Data Integrity Virus Protection
12. Documentation InfoSec Documentation
13. Security Awareness and Training Security Awareness and Training
14. Incident Response Incident Handling/Security Advisory Handling
Technical Controls  
15. Identification and Authentication Identification and Authentication
16. Logical Access Controls Account Management/Access Controls Session Controls
17. Audit Trails Audit Security Products External Connectivity
   

 


Technical Controls
15. Identification and Authentication Identification and Authentication
16. Logical Access Controls Account Management/Access Controls Session Controls
17. Audit Trails Audit Security Products External Connectivity

Implement Effective Security Related Personnel Policies

This is also a very challenging area because it forces you to coordinate and get concurrence with
many different organizations to make it work. It involves labor relations, human resources, legal,
and contracting people. The following control areas for personnel security are outlined in GAO FISCAM.

1. Background checks
2. Reinvestigations
3. Nondisclosure agreements
4. Regular vacations and shift rotations
5. Termination and Transfer Procedures
a. Return of equipment, ID, keys, etc.
b. Termination of User IDs and Passwords
c. Identifying Non-disclosure period effectiveness
6. Skills needed are identified in job descriptions and employees are rated against those skills
7. Employee has a training plan and training is documented and monitored

I have found that other than training which is covered in other areas, that background checks and
termination and transfer procedures are critical in minimizing insider risk. This is especially true with
the proliferation of contractor and temporary employees. Regular vacations and shift rotations are a
great idea, but in this day of massive downsizing and doing more with less it is not always practical
to have the only person that knows the job be gone at a critical time. I realize that there should always
be backups for everything, but management does not always want to budget for it.

Monitor the Security Program’s Effectiveness and Make Changes as Necessary

Monitoring the effectiveness of the security program can be one of the most challenging aspects of
running a security program, but also one of the most important. This is where the rubber meets the
road. You have assessed the overall risk, created a program plan and security policies. You have given
out guidance and trained the individuals in implementing the policy. Now it’s time to see if you have
actually increased the security posture of your organization. In large organizations and limited
centralized IT Security staff you will have to rely on a combination of self-reporting and hands on reviews.

These can include the following:
1. NIST 800-26 reviews with supporting documentation
2. Vulnerability and system scanning of technical controls and system vulnerabilities
3. Random onsite checks of operational and technical controls
4. Specific security policy compliance reviews
5. Audit finding reviews

Although the entire version is very cumbersome, a tailored version of the NIST 800-26
“Self Questionnaire” is a good place to start. It lets individual major applications and general support
systems report back centrally on the status of their security controls. It is broken down into the 17
control areas defined in table 1. It further asks you whether or not you have created policies, created procedures; implemented, tested, and fully integrated each of these control areas into the security
of your system. As you implement each of the five levels - policy, procedures, implementation, test,
and integration you move further up the maturity level. This is very similar to the Software Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity Model (CMM) for software development.

It is critical that you use a common sense approach when implementing this or you can get very
bogged down in a lot of documentation that does not really increase your security posture. Quickly
getting at the critical elements by having your system security officers first perform a risk assessment
and create a security plan for their system will greatly enhance the usability of this tool.

The other methods listed above can also be implemented via a variety of actual hands-on review
and/or tabletop review of documentation. Much of it depends on the amount of resources you have
and how successful your experience is with self-reporting. In many cases, self-reporting
does not uncover serious vulnerabilities.

We have now completed a variety of program monitoring and have come up with a variety of
weaknesses based on a lack of implementation. The next step is to uncover why. Is it because the
policy and guidance is not clear? Is it a lack of resources, expertise, or management support? Do
some people just not care about security?

The answer is all of the above. That is why it is critical to get out and talk to your system
administrators, security officers, business and system program managers and upper level
executives. You have to work with them to come up with a viable solution to their problems with implementation. You have to make sure that your office becomes a central focal point and that
different divisions can leverage off your expertise as well as the expertise of others in the organization.
You have to attack the most critical areas first and leave the rest for another day. They will vary
somewhat for different systems, but the SANS “Top Twenty” is a real good place to start. It is
critical to get buy-in from the top down and the bottom up to maintain an effective security program.
If people do not believe in the process they will go through the motions, but you will not be very
successful. On the other hand, you will always have individuals who do not want to follow the rules no
matter what and you do need to be able to enforce the policies on those individuals.